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The article examines whether theories based on an immanent
worldview- roughly, one that denies the existence of
transcendent principle or agents relevant to human life- offer a
better solution to the problems of political pluralism than do
transcendent theories. After reviewing three such theories- one
from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, one from Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and one from William Connally
the author argues that theories like Connolly's, which both
make posttlve claims and explicitly acknowledge the
contestability of those claims, are the most defensible. At the
same time, even those theories run into the problems of
transcendent theories, especially relying on assumptions they
cannot prove. Thus, the author suggests that we may need to be
more modest in our expectations of how persuasive any such
theory can be.
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INTRODUCTION
One main focus of contemporary political theory has been the issue of
value pluralism. 1 The basic concern is both clear and troubling: to the
extent that people disagree in their moral judgments, it may be difficult
or even impossible to create political institutions and rules that are
acceptable to everyone. That appears to create a dilemma: either we will
have to accept a very limited kind of political cooperation, restricted to
those issues on which we can find common ground (as, for example,
Chandran Kukathas argues 2 ) , or we will have to accept that every society
will inevitably impose its institutions and rules onto some citizens who
do not recognize their legitimacy and feel themselves to be both
oppressed by and trapped within their polity.
While this may at first glance appear to be a problem that is internal to
political liberalism, with its special concern for eliciting the willing
consent of the governed and avoiding imposing nonconsensual
obligations, the problem of value pluralism is a political universal. Every
conception of politics has to in some way explain why some citizens
reject the institutions and rules of the society, and every actual polity has
to figure out how to deal with fundamental dissent, both as a practical
problem and as an ethical problem.
Thinking abstractly, there are three possible responses to this problem.
First, we might discount the reasons of dissidents (as mental illness, self
interest masquerading as principle, sedition, ignorance, and so on) and
simply impose our institutions and rules despite their disagreement.
That's certainly a possible response, and I doubt that anything I write
here could change the mind of someone who was committed to such a
course of action. However, my bet is that most people have seen how
cynically this strategy can be used as a way to reinforce the power of
elites, and thus that most readers will agree that moral arguments need
moral, not just coercive, responses. Second, we might believe that at
some point in the future all human beings will come to hold the same
moral values, and will apply them the same way to circumstances, such
that moral disagreement will no longer be a problem. (Similarly, we
might believe that human beings will at some point abandon the
idea/language of morality itself, which would lead to the same outcome.)
Many anarchists and some Marxists (not to mention many moral
philosophers) hold this view, seeing moral disagreement as ultimately the
product of inequality and/or ignorance. While that position may of
course ultimately tum out to be correct, it doesn't offer us any practical
guidance about what to do today, and thus isn't an adequate response to

the practical problem of value pluralism. For the foreseeable future , in
every existing society, the problem of value pluralism is both real and
apparently inevitable. We need some acceptable, concrete, political
response to it. Third and finally, we might hope that we could identify
some argument (and perhaps some corresponding rules and institutions)
that everyone could in fact agree with, thus overcoming the
disagreement. Most of the recent work on value pluralism has pursued
this strategy (as has a great deal of related work, for example that of John
Rawls 3 ).
While a handful of writers have argued that the problem of value
pluralism is intractable, such that no conceivable argument or course of
action could entirely resolve it,4 the majority of people working on this
problem have sought various strategies to arrive at agreement. Many
such theories are transcendental- that is, their response to plurality is
based on identifying supra-human principles that do or should constrain
human behavior, and that, in principle, all rational people should
recognize and accept. Some of those transcendental theories seek to
overcome plurality, either by showing that everyone should have the
same values (Kant), that people who are different nonetheless have
harmonious interests (Plato, Aristotle), or that differences are
epiphenomenal, masking an underlying or ultimate unity (Hegel). Other
transcendental theories seek to embrace plurality, at least to some degree.
In that camp we find realist pluralists like Isaiah Berlin, with his apparent
endorsement of negative liberty as the best response to the inevitability
of moral disagreement, 5 as well as John Gray, 6 who argues that the
plurality of real values means that no form of life (including the liberal
preference for negative liberty) can claim preeminence. 7
The criticisms of these transcendental theories are numerous and
complex. For purposes of the present essay, I merely want to note that
many people have rejected transcendental explanations of and responses
to plurality, and that some of those critics have turned to immanent
theories as a possible alternative. Thus, over the last 20 years, there has
been a surge of interest in the idea of immanence among political
theorists. Put simply, immanence is the idea that there are no
transcendental principles or agents relevant to human life, and that
whatever norms, institutions, or critiques we generate must be explicated
and defended without reference to such transcendentals. One suggestion
that has been made in recent immanence literature, and the one that I will
be concerned with in this essay, is that perhaps philosophies of
immanence could help us with pluralism.8

This paper looks at three immanence theories- from Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and William
Connolly. At first glance, these thinkers might seem an odd choice for
such a comparison. On the one hand, Hardt/Negri and Deleuze/Guattari
were strongly influenced by each other's work. They comment
extensively on each other's writings, and in the 1980s Negri and Guattari
co-wrote a book called Nouvelle espaces de liberte, published in English
as Communists Like Us 9 • For those reasons, it might seem that their ideas
will be so similar that a comparison won't be fruitful. One the other
hand, despite the fact that Connolly openly acknowledges the influence
that Deleuze and Negri have had on his own work, his approach to these
questions is quite different. For one thing, while Deleuze/Guattari and
Negri/Hardt are all associated with Marxism understood broadly,
Connolly is more typically associated with liberalism and social
democracy. Similarly, Deleuze/Guattari and Hardt/Negri are working
within the continental philosophical tradition, while Connolly is largely
working within the Anglo-American analytic tradition (understood very
broadly), though that's less true of his recent work. Finally, of all the
thinkers, Connolly is the only one who has actively engaged in the
largely Anglo-American debate about pluralism that this essay discusses.
Despite those potential concerns, there are several compelling reasons
to examine these particular thinkers. The most significant reason is that
these thinkers have been the most prominent exponents of immanence
politics over the past few decades. Negri, for example, has been
developing an immanence politics at least since the late 1970s, when he
was writing The Savage Anomaly, on Spinoza' s metaphysics and their
relevance for politics. 10 His three recent and influential books with Hardt
(Empire, Multitude, 11 and Commonwealth) explicitly call for a politics
based on immanence (as discussed in more detail below). Deleuze (with
his frequent collaborator Guattari) is probably the person most identified
with the contemporary politics of immanence, and there is a substantial
literature on his approach to that issue. 12 Finally, over the past 20 years
Connolly has also become a major figure in the discussion of the politics
of immanence, particular with the publication of his books Why I am Not
a Secularist and Capitalism and Christianity, American Style.
The second major reason to compare these particular thinkers is that
the significant differences in their approaches allow us to get a synoptic
view of immanence politics generally. Thus, for example, in working out
a politics of immanence, Deleuze/Guattari and Hardt/Negri took very
different directions. Deleuze and Guattari focused on, for want of a more
accurate term, ontology, articulating a way of understanding the structure

of the world and personal identity that could both explain radical
difference and articulate principles for a new kind of politics. Although
Hardt and Negri also examined ontology, for example in Negri's Savage
Anomaly, which was translated into English by Hardt, their more recent
work focuses on changes in the mode of production and the distribution
of sovereign power- that is, on subjectivity and political possibility
under current conditions. Thus the two pairs of thinkers present us with
two very different approaches to justifying the politics of immanence
one rooted in ontology, and the other rooted in historical contingency.
Connolly's approach is less committed to a radical restructuring of either
our ideas or our institutions. He addresses the same problems, and has
roughly the same general strategy of achieving cooperation, justice, and
freedom through a politics of immanence, but his focus is on identifying
relatively small changes (of attitude, orientation, belief, processes of
maintaining the self, and so on) that could generate those results. Thus,
comparing these particular thinkers allows us to investigate whether a
radical change in our view of ontology or current political conditions, or
contrarily a more gradual and piecemeal conception of change, could
allow a politics based in immanence to adequately address the problems
of value pluralism.

GENERAL PROBLEMS
It's helpful to think of immanence theories as tending towards three
types or flavors, which of course blend together in different ways in any
particular theory. The first tendency is towards declaration. Declarations
are affirmative, even apodictic, claims about how the world is and what
follows from that description. Spinoza's Ethics is a good example of this
tendency- it offers a comprehensive ontology and metaphysics, along
with arguments about what follows from those premises, while
remaining an immanence theory by resolutely denying that there are any
principles or agents in the universe other than those that emerge
contingently. The second tendency is towards description. Descriptive
theories say: here's how I think of the world; it's been helpful to me;
perhaps you'll find it helpful too. Probably the best example of this
tendency is Pyrrhonian skepticism, with its insistence that even its own
claims cannot be known to be true, but that many people have found
acting as if they were truly helpful. 13 The third tendency, which is
roughly in between declaration and description, is invitation. Invitations
say: here's what I believe; I can't prove my claims definitively, but here
are some elements of my beliefs that I think you are likely already to

agree with, and here are some reasons why you might come to agree with
more of my beliefs after some reflection. Buddhism is a nice example of
an invitation, with its initial claim that most people naturally come to see
that life contains much suffering, its claim to have a method of relieving
that suffering, and its emphasis on the point that each person must
investigate that claim for him- or herself. 14
Each tendency comes with its own characteristic problems.
Declarations run into essentially the same problems as transcendental
theories- making contestable assumptions, claiming more than they can
prove (especially in terms of normative judgments), and hypostatizing
the contingent into the necessary. At the opposite extreme, descriptions
run the risk of being seen as poetry rather than philosophy. That is, to the
extent that a philosophy of immanence is purely an optional perspective,
one for which no truth-claims are made, it is open to the objection that
while it may be of great help to its adherents, there is no reason to think
that it will be widely enough adopted to be ofbroader social significance.
Note that these problems are especially troublesome for a theory that
aims to address the problem of value pluralism. For example, every
philosophy rests on contestable premises, and any premise could in
principle be contested. That's not a philosophical problem- without
contestable assumptions no philosophy could get going in the first place.
But it is a practical problem- to the extent that a philosophy rests on a
larger number of contestable premises, or rests on premises that a larger
number of people are in fact likely to contest, that philosophy will be less
able to secure broad agreement under conditions of value pluralism.
Finally, precisely because they take a midway position between
declaration and description, invitations suffer from both sets of problems.
When they make affirmative claims, they act like declarations. When
they affirm their own contestability, they act like descriptions. Thus, at
this very general level, the question is whether any immanence theory
will be able to overcome these structural and logical problems to address
the problem of value pluralism.
HARDT AND NEGRI

In Empire, Multitude, and the recently published Commonwealth, 15
Hardt and Negri are explicitly attempting to articulate an immanence
based vision of politics and political change. As I argue below, I believe
that their argument is largely a declaration, and that it therefore
encounters some significant problems typical of that approach. In these
three books, Hardt and Negri are making four main claims: (1) that the

dominant form of sovereignty is shifting from a disciplinary to a control
model (Empire), whose primary focus is the production and management
of subjectivities; (2) that this shift in sovereignty is one manifestation of
a general shift from transcendence to immanence; (3) that this new form
of sovereignty offers better opportunities for resistance and fundamental
change than did the prior, nation-state system of sovereignty; (4) and that
such an immanentist revolt by the multitude would result in a
normatively better world than the current one.

From Nation-States to Empire
As Hardt and Negri themselves say, their primary focus is a shift in the
dominant form of political sovereignty. 16 This new form of rule
combines political, economic, and social/cultural spheres of production,
distribution and control. It is characterized by two related currents of
change. On the one hand, power is being centralized, because any given
locus of power is increasingly likely to have effects on several different
aspects of life. Multinational corporations, for example, embody not only
the traditional functions of businesses, but also in some cases aspects of
political sovereignty, and even functions traditionally associated with
cultural or social production. On the other hand, power is being
decentralized, because no particular locus of power is capable of
exercising control either extensively (over the entire globe), or
intensively (over every aspect oflife within its domain).

From Transce nde nce to Immanence
This shift from centralized and territorial nation-state to decentralized
and deterritorialized Empire reflects a broader shift away from
transcendence and towards immanence in all areas of life. Hardt and
Negri discuss three different kinds of transcendence, all of which they
believe are rapidly being abandoned. The first is the transcendence of the
divine or supernatural over the human or natural. 17 The second area of
shift from transcendence to immanence is in the relationship of the
sovereign to the people. Finally, there is a shift from transcendence to
immanence in the relationship between humanity and non-human nature .
These three shifts away from transcendence add up to a general
discarding of the concept. It is not simply that we are adopting immanent
forms of power and control, but that we are abandoning transcendence as
an idea. They write : "Not only the political transcendental but also the
transcendental as such has ceased to determine measure." 18 In other

words, the very idea that we can measure or evaluate the world according
to some transcendental standard has become incredible, and is rapidly
being abandoned in both theory and practice.
New and Better Opportunities ofRevolt

Part of what makes the development of Empire worthy of examination
is that it provides greater opportunities for resistance and change than
did the nation-state model of sovereignty. 19 This is because the
fundamental contradiction within Empire is not the spatial limits of
capitalist expansion, but rather the inherent precariousness of a system
whose stability and productivity rely on citizens being educated,
independent, and creative, though never fully in control of their time, the
products of their labor, or their desire to form community. They write:
"Here we are thus faced with a paradox. Empire recognizes and profits
from the fact that in cooperation bodies produce more and in community
bodies enjoy more, but it has to obstruct and control this cooperative
autonomy so as not to be destroyed by it."20 And, they predict: "The
paradox is irresolvable: the more the world becomes rich, the more
Empire, which is based on this wealth, must negate the conditions of the
production of wealth." 21
Why the Immanent World ofthe Multitude Would be Better

Like Marx, Hardt and Negri are somewhat ambiguous about their
normative commitments. At times, they appear to be making a purely
descriptive claim about how the natures of power and subjectivity are
changing. But it is clear, and sometimes explicit, that they believe that
this great, epochal shift from transcendence to immanence is a good
thing. For example, in assessing the costs and benefits of the shift to
Empire, they write: "Despite recognizing [the continued existence of
domination under Empire], we insist on asserting that the construction of
Empire is a step forward . .. " 22
However, their normative endorsement of revolt against Empire, and
of the shift from transcendence to immanence generally, is complex.
Hardt and Negri argue that no external or transcendent standard of
normative preferability is available. Their argument rests on two
premises. First, because we know that subjectivity is shaped by relations
of power, we can have no access to or knowledge of the pre-social nature
of humanity. Because of this, we have no basis for judging that one
political system or another is more consonant with human nature. The

second premise is that transcendent or metaphysical standards of value
have, as a matter of fact, lost their normative force . In this sense, the
general shift from transcendence to immanence is also a shift from
metaphysics to ontology.
If we cannot use any external standards, how are we to evaluate the
normative significance of the rise of Empire? Their answer is relatively
straightforward: whatever normative criterion we use must arise
immanently from within our experience of life under Empire. "Ni die u,
ni maitre, ni I 'homme- no transcendent power or measure will determine
the values of our world. Value will be determined only by humanity's
own continuous innovation and creation." 23
More positively, Hardt and Negri identify a materialist teleology that
ultimately serves as their normative criterion. The heart of this teleology,
the telos towards which the multitude is always striving, is two desires:
autonomy and community. On the one hand, the multitude living under
Empire wants to be free: "When the new disciplinary regime constructs
the tendency toward a global market of labor power, it constructs also the
possibility of its antithesis. It constructs the desire to escape the
disciplinary regime and tendentially an undisciplined multitude of
workers who want to be free." 24 On the other hand, the multitude
continually seeks to create community free of the interference and
domination of Empire : "Outside every Enlightenment cloud or Kantian
reverie, the desire of the multitude is . . . a common species." 25
Hardt and Negri emphasize two related points about this materialist
teleology: it is socially and historically constructed, and it is non
dialectical. The first point, that the teleology is constructed, is essential to
its being truly immanent. The second point, that the teleology is non
dialectical, is crucial both to establish its immanent origins and to
separate Empire from authoritarian Marxisms. Theirs is a teleology with
a dire ction, but neither an end-point nor ne cessary s tages. 26
The teleology rests on three assumptions, which Hardt and Negri
themselves occasionally assert openly, and which begin to undermine the
teleology's ostensibly immanent origins. First, people want to be free, in
the sense of having individual autonomy: " Disobedience to authority is
one of the most natural and healthy acts. To us it seems completely
obvious that those who are exploited will resist and- given the necessary
conditions- rebel."27 Second, people want to create community:
"Beyond the simple refusal, or as part of that refusal, we need also to
construct a new mode of life and above all a new community. This
project leads not toward the naked life of homo tantum [mere man] but
toward homohomo, humanity squared, enriched by the collective

intelligence and love of the community." 28 Finally, although subjectivity
is partially constituted socially and historically, there are limits to the
possible forms of human life; even under unfavorable conditions, people
will continue to want to be free and to form community: "The teleology
of the multitude is theurgical; it consists in the possibility of directing
technologies and production toward its own joy and its own increase of
power. The multitude has no reason to look outside its own history and
its own present productive power for the means necessary to lead toward
its constitution as a political subject."29 This last claim opens onto a
larger one: there is no likely change in relations of power or control that
could quash or destroy the multitude's desire for freedom and
community. Indeed, Hardt and Negri are silent on this issue. From their
perspective, there appears to be no possibility that Empire might win .30
The question that I want to address is whether Hardt and Negri can get
from this ostensibly descriptive characterization of conditions under
Empire to their normative conclusion that Empire is a step forward,
without violating their immanentist commitments. Below I argue that
they cannot.
G en e ral Proble ms and Possibilities ofImmanent Normativity
The only way that we could make truly immanent normative
judgments is if our normative criteria were genuinely contingent, such
that they could be different under other circumstances. For example, if
my society requires motorists to drive on the right side of the road, I have
a real if contingent basis for normative judgment regarding someone who
drives down my street on the left side. Normative judgments based on
contingent principles suffer from two limitations. The first is that the
judgments are limited and local- they are only relevant to the people
who happen to hold the contingent principle serving as our criterion. To
people outside that group, the various normative claims will appear
spurious. This problem of the insistent locality of normative criteria leads
to the second problem for immanent theories of judgment: there is no
non-contentious way to rank conflicting or competing criteria. This
problem arises for Hardt and Negri, though they do not acknowledge it.
Their discussion of the changes in the process of subjection (the creation
and management of subjectivities) only talks about the emerging
subjectivity of the multitude, but of course there is another subjectivity
that is also part of the process: that of the exploiters and managers of
Empire. The exploiters must have a subjectivity that is different from that
of the multitude, one for example that sees limiting autonomy and the

creation of community as acceptable, necessary, and perhaps even good.
By hypothesis, this subjectivity and the normative criteria that it
acknowledges have emerged immanently, through the processes that
constitute Empire, just as the subjectivity of the multitude has arisen.
These two problems- the locality of immanent normative criteria and
the existence of groups with incompatible and incommensurable
criteria- undermine Hardt and Negri's normative project. Given that the
immanent functioning of Empire produces two combating subjectivities,
what basis do we have for choosing one over the other, for favoring the
multitude over the exploiters? Whatever basis we end up identifying, it
obviously cannot have been produced immanently within the situation,
because that would merely re-pose the same question again, as one side
favors the criterion and the other rejects it. Rather, any dispositive
criterion must be based in some normative goal exterior- that is,
transcendent- to Empire itself, such that it is capable of showing that
one immanently generated perspective is normatively mistaken. Thus, on
the one hand, whatever normative criteria do emerge immanently can
only be applied locally and contingently (if we are committed to an
immanent method ofjudgment), and, on the other hand, if more than one
normative criterion is generated by the immanent working of the world,
we will have no immanent basis for choosing among them. Hardt and
Negri cannot justify their normative preference for the triumph of the
multitude without appealing to some normative criterion that is at least
partially independent of the situation they seek to analyze. At every turn,
the insistent locality of the available normative criteria gets in the way of
the aspiration to universality of the judgment.
As I suggested above, I believe that this kind of problem- claiming
more than they can prove- is typical of declaration-type immanence
theories. It's hard to see how any theory could successfully argue that all
normative principles are local and contingent but also that some of those
principles are nonetheless absolutely preferable to the others. Hardt and
Negri show us the limit of this kind of immanent theorizing.
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI

Deleuze and Guattari propose a different and more sophisticated
method of making immanent normative judgments, one that aspires to
avoid the problem Hardt and Negri encounter, though it takes some
explaining to get to it. Although this is not how Deleuze and Guattari
themselves would proceed, it is easiest for me to summarize their work
by presenting it as a system. Let's start with the Cosmos, 3 1 which is

everything. The most basic elements/constituents of the Cosmos are
flows, which are quanta of energy in motion. Deleuze famously argues
that the genetic element of everything is difference,32 and that point is
easy to understand at this very simple level. It doesn't make sense to
attribute essence or identity to a quantum of energy, since any such
statements would be so abstract as to be meaningless. But it does make
sense to note differences that differentiate the quantum from other quanta
(and instances of void); thus for example it makes sense to talk about a
quantum occupying a particular part of three-dimensional space precisely
because other quanta do not occupy that area, it makes sense to talk
about a quantum having a particular frequency or wavelength because
that clarifies how it might interact with other quanta from which it
differs, and further it makes sense to talk about a quantum of energy
moving in a direction, but only relative to other quanta (since there are
no absolute directions in space).
There are countless flows , which are themselves apparently without
any prior cause . As the flows interact (apparently not according to any
necessity or laws), they give rise to other/different flows and also to
assemblages 33 in which two or more flows enter into a more-or-less
temporary, shifting, contingent relationship. There are lots of different
kinds of assemblages, and it seems that matter and its various
compositions are all assemblages.
Essentially the same relationship gets reproduced on (at least) three
different levels- inorganic nature, organic nature, and human society. At
each level, the compositions are contingent and unstable, and of course
each level interacts with the other levels. Similarly, all
compositions/assemblages are comprised of heterogeneous elements, so
they are always open to influence from external sources, and they always
contain lines of flight (tendencies or possibilities of decomposition or
rearrangement) . In principle all assemblages are influenced by all other
assemblages (another reason that difference is constitutive- the idea of
self-sufficient identity is an illusion), though in practice some influences
are infinitesimal (such as the gravitational pull of distant stars).
Deleuze and Guattari talk about two different planes of the
organization of matter I flows I assemblages- the plane of consistency I
immanence I composition (sometimes also called the earth or the Body
without Organs or matter)/ 4 and the plane of stratification (sometimes
also called the strata).35 It's ambiguous whether these are meant to be
understood as conceptual but universal (so that every assemblage
stretches between them, and they are constituted by the totality of
assemblages), or whether they are merely ideal-types that indicate the

two poles of assemblage-ness (the m1n1mum degree of interaction
necessary for flows to maintain a relationship with each other, and a
maximum degree ofhypostatization of the assemblage as an identity). 36
There are two basic kinds of assemblage: molar and molecular. Molar
assemblages are large scale, but are also aimed at system- at creating a
comprehensive
system
within
which
particularities
can
be
comprehended, classified, and managed. Molecular assemblages are
small scale, but they are also particularistic- they are concerned with
themselves, not with either subordinating other assemblages or
subordinating themselves to a larger assemblage. Every assemblage has
both molar and molecular aspects I tendencies, and the terms are
relative- an assemblage can be molar with respect to some assemblages
and molecular with respect to others. (The nation state is a good
example- it's molar with respect to its own population, but molecular
with respect to other nation states.)
Every assemblage can be thought of as being made of three kinds of
lines or tendencies of movement. Molar lines move the assemblage
towards stratification, molecular lines move the assemblage towards an
emphasis on the particular, and thus towards the plane of
consistency/immanence, and lines of flight move the assemblage towards
dissolution, towards metamorphosing into a different assemblage. (In
some places Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest that molecular lines
and lines of flight are the same. In other places, they suggest that lines of
flight can only be instantiated in molecular parts of the assemblage, and
thus they coincide without being identical.) In essence, there are always
these three tendencies in any assemblage- towards hypostatization and
domination over other assemblages, towards a focus on its own
particularity, and towards dissolution and entering into new assemblages.
So, roughly, flows cohere into assemblages, which are primarily
molecular. Relationships among assemblages lead to the formation of
molar strata, which capture I constrain assemblages (even though of
course ultimately they just are those assemblages in a particular
formation). At each level, the relationships are contingent and not based
on any underlying identity or necessity. Since the elements making up
each assemblage I stratum are heterogeneous, the larger units always
contain conflicting elements and therefore lines of flight. Thus there are
constant processes of coding (forming strata), decoding (elements
escaping from a stratum) and recoding ("free" elements being
incorporated into a new stratum).
What is left out of this ontology is just as important as what is
included: there is no god, no transcendent source of morality, and very

little by way of intrinsic natural laws (other than those that emerge
contingently and are always in the process of modification). Deleuze and
Guattari are explicit that this view of the world is meant to be strictly
immanent, and also that their goal is provoking us to thought and
reconsideration more than achieving a faithful depiction of the actual.
The point of developing this unusual metaphysics is ultimately political.
At the risk of simplifying too far, it seems to me that Deleuze and
Guattari are fighting against two related though distinct problems. The
first is the macro-level problem of the permanent war society, and the
second is the universal micro-level problem of each of us being
constrained into the terms of our current identities and self
understandings, and thereby having possible avenues of change blocked.
Explaining the problem of the permanent war society requires some
backtracking. In analyzing the origins of the modem state, Deleuze and
Guattari argue that the state as a molar organization coevolved with what
they call the nomadic war machine, which is a molecular organization.
The state's drive is towards capture- bringing people, land, institutions,
and so on together in order to control them and to harvest surplus from
them. The war machine's drive is towards maintaining smooth space
that is, towards perpetuating the molecular groupings and interactions
that exist before/outside of/despite/in response to the state. They are at
pains to argue that the two phenomena evolved at the same time and in
response to each other, and that every human community contains some
elements ofboth.
Although the war machine is not defined by the conduct of actual war,
it is defined by hostility to molarity and the state. When the two forms
come into conflict, actual war does erupt. In response to actual war, the
state needs to develop its own war machine, which it can do either by
incorporating an existing machine (hiring mercenaries, conscripting the
previously nomadic residents of a new territory) or by creating a new one
itself. If the state does not succeed in capturing a war machine, it will be
destroyed by the nomads. But, and this is crucial, the motivating logics
of the state and of the war machine are completely different. The state is
molar while the war machine is molecular; the state seeks capture while
the war machine seeks to avoid being captured; the state sees violence as
subordinated to a larger goal while the war machine sees violence as a
basic constituent of its identity.
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that in the contemporary world, the war
machines of the various states have actually become primary over the
capture functions . In a sense, the state now exists to serve the military.
But, again crucially, the militaries of the various states have more in

common with each other than they do with the civilian leadership of their
respective states. In this sense, we have something closer to one
enormous war machine ofwhich the various national states and militaries
are merely instantiations. Increasingly, they argue, we are led by the
internal logic of the war machine. 37
Deleuze and Guattari point out that although this domination of the
worldwide war machine constitutes a line of flight from the state, it
appears to be a negative line, one that leads to death rather than to new
possibilities. This is consistent with their definition of fascism (adopted
from Paul Virilio) as being a suicidal form of social organization, one in
which violence itself is the organizing principle and goal. Implicitly,
then, they fear that the world has created a system for itself that is
increasingly shutting off avenues for change and leading us towards
literal destruction.
Their micro-scale concern is similar to this macro-level fear. They
worry that many aspects of life- from the way we conceive of
philosophy, to the organization of capitalism, to psychology, linguistics,
and even our conception of revolution- are encouraging us to reify and
solidify our existing identities, institutions, habits, ideas, dreams, and so
on, thereby shutting down avenues of connection to others (even others
of very different orders, such as non-human animals, plants, etc.). The
danger is both that we will deny the fact of the very real connections that
tie us to everything else in the cosmos, and that in doing so we will deny
ourselves countless avenues for possible development and change.
Closing down those avenues of connection and change restrict our
possibilities of desire, power, and freedom- all understood in Deleuze
and Guattari's special uses of those terms.
Desire, power, and freedom are all different aspects of the same
underlying quality of assemblages I bodies (a quality closely analogous
to Spinoza's conatus). It helps to take another step back here, this time to
cosmology again. The simplest assemblages are two different quanta of
energy that become connected in some way- to simplify, let's say one is
an electron and the other is a proton. When they come into interaction
with one another, their relative energies get combined in whatever way
they allow- in this case, the electron orbits the proton, forming a
hydrogen atom. (If two electrons had come into contact with each other,
they would not have been able to form a stable combination, and no
assemblage would result.) That atom will come into contact with other
atoms and quanta, and eventually it will become involved in larger and
larger assemblages (obviously not all atoms have this experience). At
each level, what determines what the assemblage does? Well, the

interactions between the assemblage's internal qualities (energy, mass,
etc.) and those of the external quanta and assemblages that it comes into
contact with. That's true at every level- quantum, atom, molecule,
single-celled organism, tiger, human society, etc. Some assemblages can
interact with a larger array of outside elements than can other
assemblages, and some assemblages do so interact (and thus change)
more often or easily than do others.
These three qualities- the internal energies/composition of the
assemblage, the number of external elements that the assemblage can
interact with, and the easy/ frequency with which the assemblage does
interact with outside elements (and thereby changes) correspond to
desire, power, and freedom. Desire is the internal capacity or disposition
to interact with external elements in certain ways, power is the relative
capacity of the assemblage to interact with more or fewer external
elements, and freedom is the actual frequency of those interactions and
changes. 38 To the extent that existing avenues of connection and change
are closed down, and to the extent that we are discouraged from opening
up new ones, our desire is inhibited, our power is reduced, and we are
less free . Deleuze and Guattari' s main concern is that this is precisely
what is happening today.
Their proposed solution is partial and not entirely satisfying. They
argue forcefully that both smooth space and striated space (that is, both
molecular assemblages and molar ones) are essential for life, and that
there is no possibility of pure smoothness or pure molecularity. 39 Rather,
what we can hope for is a constant process of seeking new connections,
new avenues, new changes, of undermining existing blockages and
seeking to prevent new ones. All of these processes are summed up in
what Deleuze and Guattari call "becoming." 40 There can be no final
becoming, no stable state in which no further changes are either
necessary or possible. Rather, becoming is a process that we can pursue
but never complete. At the moment, and probably under most
circumstances, becoming will be associated with moving towards the
smooth and the molecular, and away from the striated and the molar. But
under other circumstances, moving in the opposite direction might be
how becoming is best achieved.
So, how can all of this help us with plurality? That depends in part on
what kind of theory Deleuze and Guattari are putting forward. Although
they are insistent that their ontology is intended to spur thinking rather
than to make truth-claims (that is, that it is a description rather than a
declaration), I think that we cannot entirely take them at their word. If we
don't take most of the elements of their worldview as being accurate

descriptions of the actual, their conclusions make no sense. If there really
is a god, if there really are transcendent moral laws, if organisms were
created and have inborn natures, and so on, their conceptions of desire,
power, and freedom are deeply problematic, and there's no obvious
reason that we should adopt them. To get to their normative preference
for becoming, we have to accept their ontology as being a more-or-less
true depiction of the world. That is, we have to treat it as a declaration.
That's not necessarily a problem. Their ideas have to be based on
something, and the details of their ontology are compelling in many
places. However, as with Hardt and Negri, a problem arises about the
status of their normative preferences. 41 Deleuze bases his preference for
becoming on the Nietzschean will to power, understood roughly as I
have explained desire, power, and freedom above- as a contingent,
internal quality of assemblages. 42 As Daniel Smith puts the point: "A
mode of existence can be evaluated, apart from transcendental or
universal values, by the purely immanent criteria of its power or capacity
(puissance), that is, by the manner in which it actively deploys its power
by going to the limit of what it can do (or, on the contrary, by the manner
in which it is cut off from its power to act and is reduced to
impotence)."4 3 In other words, just by their immanent, contingent,
internal functioning, assemblages will always seek that course of action
that (appears to) permit their becoming.
The question is whether that makes sense as a normative criterion. To
see the problem, remember that we expect normative principles to be
able to support two different kinds of judgments-one is about what I
should prefer for myself, and the other is about what I should prefer for
others. It seems obvious that Deleuze's immanent criterion ofpreferring
becoming provides a normative principle that any subject could use to
make judgments about what he/she/ it preferred for him/her/itself. Faced
with a choice, and assuming that Deleuze is correct about the inner
motivation of assemblages, I will always choose the course of action that
(appears to) permit my own becoming. But- and here we are back on
very familiar ground- there is another question: Is there any reason that
I must prefer (or act to support) the becoming of others? This is the
traditional objection to hedonic theories of normative judgment. We can
understand why one would prefer hedonic goods for oneself, but not why
one should want those goods for others, especially when that may
conflict with one getting them oneself.
It won't do to object that this way of putting the problem is defective
because Deleuze and Guattari are precisely trying to undermine these
kinds of hypostatized divisions between subject and object, self and

other. At any given moment, there exist certain assemblages with certain
qualities (some of which are mutually contradictory); it is those
assemblages that must make normative choices, or about which we other
assemblages must make normative judgments. It's plausible (though far
from certain) that all assemblages have an innate preference for
maximizing their own becoming, which of course entails that they would
change into new assemblages to some degree. But it does not follow
from that premise that all assemblages have an innate preference for
maximizing the becoming of the other assemblages that happen to exist
in this moment of time. An assemblage currently following a molar line
of flight will seek to subsume other assemblages as part of its own
(perhaps misguided) conception of its own path to becoming, even if
being subsumed is not consistent with those other assemblages'
conceptions of the best path to their own becomings. Two assemblages
will compete over limited resources that both need for their survival.
Being committed to becoming doesn't mean accepting a suicidal
fatalism, the view that any change is ipso facto for the good.
If every assemblage seeks its own becoming, but most or all
assemblages will disregard the becoming of other assemblages when it
comes into (perhaps only apparent) conflict with their own, then there is
no normative principle here. We have a principle of action, but not a
principle of judgment; hedonic relativism, not immanent criteria for
normative evaluation.
Thus, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari are caught in two dilemmas.
First, although they portray their theory as a description, it seems clear
that it can only have the practical effect they hope for it if we treat it as a
declaration. Thus, their theory encounters one of the typical problems of
descriptions- they must either be consigned to being mere poetry, or
they must abandon their nature and become descriptions. Second, the
theory's normative force rests on convincing us to favor becoming, both
for ourselves and for others. Yet that principle appears to be under
theorized- it is not at all clear why we should prefer the becoming of
others, especially in cases where it appears to interfere with our own.
Thus, Deleuze and Guattari appear to have encountered a typical
problem of declaration theories, by claiming (perhaps "suggesting" is
better) more than they can prove. Whereas Hardt and Negri have given
us too much- a normative judgment that cannot be supported by
immanent criteria- Deleuze and Guattari have given us too little : an
immanent criterion that cannot support normative judgment. Neither
approach is able to help us with the problems of pluralism, since neither

is able to justify any particular course of action to people whose initial
normative judgments and commitments differ.
CONNOLLY

William Connolly's version of immanence is an example of an
invitation theory. For purposes of analysis, we might say that Connolly's
theory starts with some basic ontological commitments. Connolly
identifies himself as an immanent naturalist. For him, naturalism means
that there is no god or supernatural force at work in the universe. Thus he
writes : " By naturalism I mean the faith that nature and human culture
survive without the aid (or obstruction) of a divine force." 44 This means
both that there is no god to either save or damn us, but also that there is
no transcendent source of normative values or judgments that we must
consult. 45 His use of immanent is slightly different from the way I have
been using it so far. He argues that the universe is "unruly," and that its
actions probably exceed the description of "lawlike statements." 4 6 Thus
by immanence he means: "a world of becoming in which the existing
composition of actuality is exceeded by open, energized potentialities
simmering in it."47
Connolly not only admits but celebrates the fact that these ontological
or metaphysical commitments are contestable. Part of the motivation for
that position is his point, made in a number of recent books including
Why I Am Not a Secularis t,48 Pluralis m , and Capitalism and Chris tianity:
American Style, that everyone has basic commitments whose truth or
necessity they cannot prove. In recent work, he refers to these basic
commitments as an existential faith : "By existential faith I mean an
elemental sense of the ultimate character of being." 4 9 And he argues that
everyone has some kind of existential faith: "To be human is to be
inhabited by existential faith. There is no vacuum in this domain, though
there might very well be ambivalence, uncertainty, and internal
plurality." 5 ° Connolly emphasizes that existential faiths are not merely
epistemological beliefs, but are also organizations of bodily experience
and habit, which exist on registers below that of discursive
consciousness. 51 And those faiths are deeply contestable, since they rest
upon beliefs and assumptions for which there is not (and may not ever
be) evidence that is overwhelmingly conclusive.
On my reading, Connolly celebrates this contestability (even of his
own deepest beliefs) for a handful of related reasons. First, the
contestability of existential faiths is itself an instance of the immanence
of the universe, the way in which the universe is always full of more

possibilities (and actualities) than we can systematize or account for. As
Nietzsche, one of Connolly's acknowledged inspirations, argues, there
are only two ways to respond to this overwhelming fecundity of the
universe: love or resentment. Like Nietzsche, Connolly chooses love. A
second reason that Connolly embraces the contestability of immanent
naturalism is because of his views on identity. As laid out most fully in
his Ide ntity/Diffe re nce, 52 Connolly subscribes to the view that identity is
always fashioned through differentiation and distinction. If that approach
is even roughly correct, then the fact that there are others who contest my
most fundamental commitments is constitutive of me as a self. From this
perspective, plurality is both a problem and the condition of possibility
for identity. There are no non-plural solutions to the problems of
plurality. A third reason that Connolly celebrates the contestability of
immanent naturalism is because he believes that the shared experience of
having our most cherished beliefs challenged may itself become a basis
for cooperation and respect across difference. 53
More generally, Connolly's approach to plurality is to seek a fair
settlement among existing identities/constituencies while also remaining
attuned to the possible emergence of new identities, rights, demands and
needs. These two elements are what Connolly refers to as pluralism and
pluralization. 54 To achieve these two goals, which are related but also in
tension with one another, Connolly suggests that two sensibilities or
ethics (he also calls them civic virtues) would be especially helpful:
agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. In a recent formulation, he
writes about agonistic respect: " An ethos of agonistic respect grows out
of mutual appreciation for the ubiquity of faith to life and the inability of
contending parties, to date, to demonstrate the truth of one faith over
other live candidates. It grows out of reciprocal appreciation for the
element of contestability in these domains. The relation is agonistic in
two senses: you absorb the agony of having elements of your own faith
called into question by others, and you fold agonistic contestation of
others into the respect that you convey toward them." 55 If agonistic
respect is about attending to existing differences, critical responsiveness
is about being attuned to new ones, whose development and emergence
will always necessarily be disruptive and disorienting. He writes:
"Critical responsiveness takes the form of careful lis tening and
presumptive g ene rosity to constituencies struggling to move from an
obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice,
obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those
registers." 5 6

These ethics are explicitly optional- they are ways of approaching the
world that Connolly believes are helpful to achieving social cooperation
given conditions of both plurality and pluralization, but there is no moral
imperative to adopt them, and no assurance that the experience of
difference will somehow spontaneously generate them. To some extent
we can draw them from existing belief systems and institutions, and to
some extent we must create them for ourselves, through micropolitical
techniques of self-fashioning (following Nietzsche and Foucault),
through arguing for our ideals, through creating partial alliances with
others with whom we have some shared beliefs, and through political
struggle to enact our preferred policies. Connolly describes this difficult
balancing act of simultaneously holding one's own beliefs, engaging in a
respectful agonism with people who hold other beliefs, and all the while
remaining open to the emergence of unforeseen new identities and
beliefs, as developing a " bicameral" understanding of ourselves.57
In contrast to this hopeful vision of what we might achieve, the great
dangers are existential resentment and eviL Existential resentment- what
Connolly also sometimes calls the drive for existential revenge 58- arises
when the contingency of both identity and existence threatens to
overwhelm us, and we respond by trying to fix identity, trying to police
difference, and with resentment against a world that contains such
maddening indeterminacy. When resentment reaches an extreme level, it
becomes evil: "The tendency to evil within faith is this: The instances in
which the faith of others incites you to anathematize it as inferior or evil
can usher into being the demand to take revenge against them for the
internal disturbance they sow, even if they have not otherwise limited
your ability to express your faith." 59 Importantly, evil is a possibility for
every faith, not just for those whose explicit commitments call for the
curtailing of difference.
Of course, despite his willingness to openly embrace the contestability
of his commitments, Connolly advocates for them forcefully. His general
commitments- roughly
social-democratic,
radically
pluralistic,
ecologically-minded- have been clear from his earliest work. How
exactly we get from here to there is necessarily a bit vague. Connolly
emphasizes the importance of visualizing both the future we want and
the interim steps we might feasibly start taking in that direction.
Although the term visualization has an unfortunate New-Age
connotation, Connolly's point is more Foucauldian: one of the ways in
which we change ourselves to become people capable of making and
sustaining a radically different kind of world is by retraining ourselves to
appreciate and understand that kind of world. If that is an important

micropolitical strategy, perhaps we can move towards macropolitics by
forming limited, strategic alliances with others whose ideals, creeds, or
spiritualities we find congeniaL As Connolly has argued about the left,
these alliances would probably be both partial and temporary, but they
would allow us to get some real political work done, they might open up
some space for developing ties with people from whom we otherwise
feel estranged, and accepting a piecemeal approach allows us to
overcome the lingering and limiting assumption that we need unity above
all else. 60 Eventually, these movements towards change would have to be
implemented by state power, though we would of course need to
remember both the contestability of these particular settlements and these
particular constituencies, and we would also need to be attentive to the
changing nature of political states. 6 1 Finally, on the philosophical front,
an important strategy is simply articulating and defending immanent
naturalism as a realistic contender among worldviews.62
Connolly acknowledges the problem of making an optional worldview
useful, and offers concrete reasons to believe that others might be drawn
to it. He writes:
But what could attract multiple constituencies to such an agenda?
Negotiation of such an ethos of pluralism, first, honors the
embedded character of faith; second, gives expression to a fugitive
element of care, hospitality, or love for difference simmering in
most faiths; third, secures specific faiths against persecution; and
fourth, offers the best opportunity for diverse faiths to coexist
without violence while supporting the civic conditions of common
governance. 63
Further, despite acknowledging his profound debts to both Spinoza64
and Deleuze, 65 Connolly gently criticizes both for their failure or
inability to acknowledge the contestability of their philosophies. In
general, he says, " no single existential faith to date, including radical
immanence, has been demonstrated so convincingly that it would be
foolish for any individual or congregation to deny it." 66
As I suggested earlier in this essay, as an invitation theory, Connolly's
approach is subject to two different sets of objections. On the one hand,
to the extent that he affirms substantive claims and commitments, like a
declaration theory, he has to make assertions that reasonable people
could contest, which thus reduces the utility of his theory as a solution to
the problem of value pluralism. On the other hand, to the extent that he
emphasizes the contestability of his claims and commitments, he risks

making his theory merely a description- an optional perspective on the
world that only the already-likeminded would be likely to support. That
approach would also limit the utility of his theory as a response to value
pluralism. Thus, at least at first glance, it seems as if Connolly's theory
may also demonstrate that immanence theories are not likely to be a
helpful response to the problems of pluralism.

CONCLUSION
Where does all of this leave us? I suggest that we can draw three
conclusions. First, descriptive immanence theories seem unlikely to
succeed in resolving the problems of value pluralism, for the anticipated
reason that the claims they make are so tentative that there's no strong
reason to believe that they will generate agreement from those whose
judgments initially disagree. Such theories avoid the obvious problem of
making strong claims that will drive away people with opposing
commitments, but at the expense of claiming so little that they are unable
to become the basis of a new agreement.
Second, neither the theory of Hardt and Negri nor the theory of
Deleuze and Guattari was able to generate an immanent criterion that
could ground adequately general normative judgments. As I argued
above, Hardt and Negri's theory delivered too much- it gave us a
criterion that could ground normative judgments, but the criterion could
not be derived from the immanence theory they provided to justify it. In
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari's theory delivered too little- it gave us a
truly immanent criterion, but one that could not sustain the kinds of
normative judgments we would need to achieve agreement under
conditions of plurality. More broadly, it's hard to see how any
immanence theory could avoid the horns of this dilemma. A criterion that
is immanent can't justify a claim to its superiority over other criteria
since that would imply a yet superior criterion for ranking them, and that
criterion's superiority would either have to be immanent, and thus
contestable within that immanent framework, or universal and therefore
transcendental- and therefore can't ground normative judgments that
have a plausible claim to universality. Conversely and for the same
reasons, it appears to be impossible to generate a universal normative
judgment based on an immanent normative criterion.
Based on these first two conclusions, it seems that neither declarative
nor descriptive immanence theories can help us solve the problem of
value pluralism, since neither can provide a plausible basis for achieving
universal agreement. Ultimately, that's not entirely surprising, since

other attempts to resolve the problems of value pluralism run into
essentially the same difficulties.67
By way of a third overall conclusion, I want to suggest that we take a
closer look at Connolly's invitation theory. As I pointed out above, it
initially appears to be doubly damned, since it is exposed to the problems
of both descriptive and declarative theories. However, we might instead
conclude that invitation theories are wily, in that they attempt to
maximize agreement while minimizing disagreement. Elsewhere I have
argued for "layered pluralism," 68 which is the idea that we cannot expect
to
achieve
universal
assent
either
to
principles
or
to
procedures/institutions, but we may be able to achieve partial but
overlapping assent or acquiescence to several different components of
social stability. For example, some people might assent to (or acquiesce
in) the moral values that animate the state (and some other people might
assent to some but not all of those values). Some of those people, and
some others, might assent to the major institutions of the political and
economic system (and again, some others might assent to some but not
all). Some of those people, and some others, might assent to the practical
working out of the political system, for example to their personal, daily
experiences with police officers, school teachers, bureaucrats, and so on
(and again, some others might assent to some but not all of these things).
Whereas someone like Rawls argues that to achieve stable cooperation
we need everyone to assent to the same small number of things
(fundamental values), 69 layered pluralism argues that we may be able to
achieve a stable society a s long as most citizens assent, most of the time,
to at least some critical mass of the many things that make up the system
of social cooperation.
Given the failure of both transcendental and immanence theories to
propose a comprehensive solution to the problem of value pluralism
that is, a compelling reason why people should in fact agree in their
moral judgments- something like layered pluralism may be the best that
we can hope for: agreement where we can get it, acquiescence where we
can' t, and an attempt to minimize outright opposition through
compromise. If it's correct that a partial, overlapping, pluralism is the
best we can do, then an invitation theory like Connolly's may offer us the
best path to achieving it. By making ontological and ethical claims,
Connolly moves away from the purely poetic pole of description. By
acknowledging the contestability of those claims, he carefully avoids the
tendency of declarative theories to claim more than they can prove. By
putting himself between those two extremes, Connolly has crafted a true
invitation- a theory that stakes some claims, acknowledges its limits,

and points out reasons why people who initially disagree with some or all
of it might nonetheless either come to agree with (some of) it, as well as
reasons why cooperation might still be possible despite continued
disagreement. His approach shows how immanence theories can defuse
possible problems, for example by staking positive claims but
acknowledging their contestability, and then using the shared pain of
acknowledging the contestability of one's views as the basis for a
possible experience of unity and similarity among people otherwise
separated by their ideas. As Connolly himself points out, there's no
guarantee that this approach will work, but his efforts to manage the
problems of immanence theories suggest that his style of theorizing may
stand the best chance of succeeding.
For those of us who hold out the hope that moral unanimity could
eventually be achieved, perhaps under better social, economic, and
political conditions, this may be a profoundly disappointing result. But
that, I believe, is precisely the challenge that value pluralism poses. The
fact that people disagree in their moral judgments, and that those
disagreements at least some of the time appear to be rooted in conflicting
moral beliefs rather than merely in error or thoughtlessness, raises the
question of how we could ever achieve consensus. If we are unwilling to
simply impose our views, due either to moral or prudential scruples, then
we will need arguments about why people should agree with us. The
extensive literature on value pluralism has attempted to identify those
arguments without success. As I believe the argument above has shown,
neither descriptive nor declarative immanence theories get us closer to
achieving agreement. That suggests both that we should change our
expectations and look to achieve something like layered pluralism, and
also that an invitation theory like Connolly's offers the approach that is
the most likely to maximize agreement while minimizing disagreement
and leaving room for renegotiation. There is much to dislike in this
solution, but that may be the nature of the world we live in.
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